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Abstract
Bidding competition plays an important role in price discovery and the determination of
suppliers in international grains.  In this paper we analyze international bidding competition for
wheat for a specific importer.  Tender data over the period 1993-1999 were analyzed and bid
functions estimated by class of wheat (hard red spring, hard amber durum, and hard red winter
denoted as HRS, HAD, and HRW, respectively) and by selling firm.  A stochastic simulation
model was developed to determine the optimal bid and to analyze factors affecting bidding
behavior and competition. 
The tender data indicated there was a surprisingly wide range of bids.  Variation of bids
across firms submitted for individual HRS tenders had standard deviations that ranged from $5/mt
or less in a number of tenders to as high as $22/mt.  Tenders for HAD show similar variability. 
Tenders for HRW showed higher variability yet with standard deviations of bids between $30 and
$40/mt.  These results show much greater variability than is normally ascribed to competition
among international grain sellers.  The spread between participants’ bids and cost indicators
ranged widely across firms.
Optimal bids and expected payoffs were derived for a prototypical bidder competing
against the existing incumbents.  Using this as a base case, we analyzed the impacts of the number
of competitors, information, and cost differentials.  In each case, we quantified the likely impact
on optimal bids and expected payoffs.
In addition, there were three particularly interesting extensions from conventional auction
models that were examined.  One was the impact of the option to the seller of supplying wheat
from Canadian origins.  Effects of Canadian offers in bid functions were not statistically different
from U.S. origins.  The effect however, was interpreted as an increase in the number of random
bidders within a tender.  The effect of this was to reduce optimal bids for HRS by $0.50/mt.  This
suggests that the effect of Canadian origin as an option is minimal when the Canadian Wheat
Board (CWB) sells through accredited exporters.  The second interesting effect was that of
correlated bids.  Results indicated a high degree of correlation among bidders which had the effect
of increasing the probability of winning, optimal bids, and expected profits.  Finally, we explored
the prospective impacts of the winner’s curse on optimal bids.  Results suggest that in light of the
winner’s curse, bidders should raise their bids; in the case of HRS, from a high of 1.9% to 7.7%
to correct for bias in value estimation, to a low of 0.2% to 3.1% when considering money left on
the table.
These results have a number of implications.  The simulations improve our understanding
of a very important mechanism of procurement and competition in international grain trading.  For
buyers, tendering is useful particularly if there is temporal variability in costs and they vary across
supply firms, if the number of bidders is large, and if information about bidders is transparent and
bidders’ offers are less correlated.  Finally, for sellers, auctions can result in intense competition
among participants.  Being low cost is essential to success in this form of competition.  Sellers
that are not low cost should avoid auctions to be successful, and bidders should make adjustments
to their bids to account for the winner’s curse.  
Key Words:  auction, bidding, wheat tenders, optimal bid, U.S., Canada*Wilson is a Professor and Dahl is a Research Scientist in the Department of Agribusiness and Applied
Economics  at North Dakota State University, Fargo.
1 With the escalation in vertical integration, contracting, and concentration in many sectors, there has
been less public information about prices and terms governing transactions.  While there are broader concerns of
interest, including distortion of producer allocation decisions, here are the strategic implications for competition
among rivals.  See Beurskens, Boehlje, and Scheid for discussions of these problems in the agribusiness sectors. 
Maixner recently summarized issues and proposals to make price reporting in livestock mandatory, which
fundamentally is a transparency issue.  
2 Noting that auctions have an important impact on suppliers, an important element of competition among
multinational firms is their apparent appetite for developing extensive and proprietary information networks.
Indeed, selling organizations without extensive information are thought to be disadvantaged.  It is also interesting
that STEs seem to fight very hard (both within their countries as well as in international trade negotiations) for
retaining the ability to be non-transparent.  
3 Several aspects of the world grain trade affect transparency.  In the U.S. marketing system, prices and
costs for marketing functions vary somewhat across domestic rivals, but are highly transparent to rivals.  These
result from public reporting of prices, basis, export tender sales (all sales made under export assistance are reported
publicly), and public tariffs for transportation and handling services.  Further, the vast majority of transactions for
U.S. domestic and offshore sales are made through formal or informal bidding processes which are reported to the
trade.  Generally, these dissemination mechanisms do not have counterparts in Canada or Australia.  Observed
prices do provide an indication of costs incurred by firms in the United States, whereas in countries with STEs
these are less useful as indicators of current pricing levels.  As a result, in many cases rivals have more refined
information about reservation values (or replacement costs as used by the trade) of U.S. trading firms than they do
for STEs.  This is particularly true during periods when a large portion of sales are made under public assistance
(e.g., EEP sales).   See Wilson, Dahl, and Johnson for a discussion of transparency in international grains
competition.
4 See Wilson and Dahl for a description of  the economies of information and the impacts of EEP on the
evolving international grain trade.
Import Tenders and Bidding Strategies in Wheat
William W. Wilson and Bruce L. Dahl
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Introduction and Scope
An important form of inter-firm and inter-country rivalry is bidding competition.  Buyers
use auctions extensively in the procurement of agricultural products to identify the low-cost
supplier, and to promote competition among rivals.  In the case of grains, auctions are used
extensively, no doubt because they are a very efficient means to determine the low-cost supplier
when suppliers’ costs cannot be observed by the buyers.  Given that costs vary randomly through
time, across competitors, and cannot be directly observed by buyers, auctions are an effective way
to identify the low-cost suppliers.  For these reasons, auctions have always been and continue to
be an important form of competition in this industry.
1  In the case of grains there are numerous
examples of auctions playing an integral role in marketing.  These include not only import
tendering as described in this study, but also auctions for EEP allocations, for rail rates and
service (Wilson, Priewe, and Dahl), and import tendering for barley in Japan (Rampton). 
Auctions have also been proposed as an alternative in Canadian grain marketing (Estey and
Kroeger).
Inter-country competition is also discerned through bidding.  This has taken on particular
relevance in recent years with concerns about the prospective impacts of transparency between
U.S. grain exporting firms and state trading enterprises.
2  The latter do not release details of their 
transactions and (it is alleged) thereby gain a competitive advantage.
3, 
4  In addition, there are2
periodic claims and concerns of the role of price leadership among selling countries (Mohanty, et
al. 1995, 1996).  Each of those studies use fairly aggregate data, assume the country is the seller,
and completely ignore the fact that a large portion of world grain is procured using tenders, which
seriously undermines prospective seller market power.
There are a number of important aspects in the analysis of bidding competition in the
international grain market.  Of particular interest are the behavior of bidders in formulating bids
and/or bidding strategies, the impact of participation, the role of information, the winner's curse,
and the impact of Canadian grain as a seller's option being offered.  In addition, correlation of bids
among bidders has an interesting impact on auction results.  Each of these aspects affects bids and
bidding competition in an interesting way.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze bidding competition and strategies in grain trading
and to assess the impacts of these effects on auction results.  Specifically, data are analyzed from
the results of tenders conducted by a private firm in a specific importing country.  Bid functions
are derived for each rival and various tests are conducted.  A stochastic simulation model was
used to determine the optimal bid for a prototypical bidder competing against existing rivals in
this market.  Simulations were conducted to analyze the impacts of a number of variables on the
optimal bid and other characteristics of the auctions.  The section below provides a description of
the analytical model.  The following section describes the auction results and bidder behavior. 
Optimal bids are derived in the next section, and effects of several factors on optimal bids are
analyzed.  The final section provides a summary and discussion of implications.  
Bidding Models
Auctions and bidding models have been the topic of numerous recent books and studies. 
Cassady provides a historical overview of auction strategies and mechanisms, and recent
bibliographies (McAffee and McMillan 1987; Engelbrecht-Wiggans; Milgrom 1985, 1989;
Rothkopf and Harstad; Klemperer) review the literature on auctions and bidding strategies.  Some
of this recent interest has been on auction design for the sale of state-owned assets (The
Economist).  Recent texts (including Monroe; Nagle and Holden; Lilien and Kotler; Rasmusen;
Dutta; Kottas and Khumawata; Phlips; and Sewall) provide practical motivations for auctions and
analytical approaches to bidding strategies.  Numerous recent studies have applied  these
techniques.  Examples include Hausch and Li; Crampton; Hughart; and McAfee and McMillan
1996.  Analytical models and studies in agriculture are summarized in Sexton (pp.189-95) and
include the more recent studies by Bourgeon and LeRoux (1996a,b) for European Union (EU)
export tenders and Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort for the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP).   
Theoretical and Analytical Models  
Bidders seek to maximize their expected payoff associated with alternative bids.  The
objective function is defined as:  E(ð) = (B - C)@P(W) where E(ð) is the expected payoff, B is the
bid, C is cost, and P(W) is the probability of winning with alternative bids.  The crucial variable is 
P(W), the probability of winning.
Conventional approaches to deriving the P(W) are discussed in Monroe; Lilian and Kotler;
and Nagle and Holden.  The approach closest to that used in this study is the specific opponent
approach (Monroe; Nagle and Holden pp. 203-204) where information exists on past bidding5 Use of bid functions has been discussed and used recently in analyzing bidding strategies in
experimental auctions in Avery and Kagel (pp. 588-589). 
3
behavior of individual (i.e., specific) bidders.  Procedures conventionally prescribed for
determining P(W) in the specific opponent approach are to: 1) assess competitor bids as a
percentage of own cost on past bidding occurrences; 2) categorize these in discrete intervals; and
3) compute the fraction of each competitor’s previous bids which exceed B.  This is interpreted as
the probability that B is less than a competitor’s (j) bid for each bidder i, Pij(W).  This approach is
a discrete method for computing the probability of underbidding an opponent using own costs as
a reference.  It can be expanded to handle multiple opponents and random opponents (i.e., those
that randomly compete in each tender).  A common theme of these approaches is that
competitor’s bid distributions are based on (derived from) own costs.  These are ultimately used
to predict bidder behavior, however, they are unobserved in most cases, which is the major
shortcoming. 
In this study, regression is used to estimate specific suppliers’ bid functions and the results
are used to predict, or to derive, the likelihood of different opponents’ bids.  Of particular
importance is the relation among bids of specific bidders during individual tenders, Bit, and some
price used as a cost indicator, Ct.  A bid function from a linear regression, Bit = ai + bi Ct +eit,
where e is N(m, s
2), can be used to predict future bids conditional upon an observable Ct.
5
Derivation of Optimal Bids 
These parameters are used to estimate expected bids of rivals.  These results are used in a
stochastic simulation model to determine the optimal bid.  First, the probability of underbidding
each specific opponent, Pij(W) across a range of potential bids is derived.  Then, the joint
probability of underbidding all opponents is computed.  Since there are multiple opponents which
are assumed to be bidding independently, then
P W P W P P W P W i i i N ij
j
N
( ) ( ) ,..., ( ) ( ) , , = = • • •
= ￿ 1 2
1
where Pi(W) is the joint probability of underbidding each opponent individually, and Pi,j(W) is the
probability of bidder i winning against competitor j.  These are used in determining the optimal
bid, which is found by identifying that bid yielding the highest expected profit, defined as  E(ð) =
(B - C)@P(W).  In a special case where the opponents do not bid in each tender, but with some
probability, then Pi
f(W)=pjc@CPi(W) + (1-pjc)C1 where Pi
f(W) is the probability of winning against a
random bidder; pjc is the probability that competitor j bids, and Pi(W) is the probability of winning. 
1-pjc is the probability that competitor j does not bid.
There is a fundamental tradeoff in determining the optimal bid.  Higher bids result in a
greater payoff, but also, a lower probability of winning.  The product of these two functions yields
the E(ð) payoff, the maximum of which is the optimal bid.  Deviations from this would affect both
the probability of winning and the payoff, and would result in a lower E(ð).  An important
parameter affecting bidding competition is the number of bidders, the effect of which is elaborated
in the empirical analysis.  Reduction in the number of bidders increases the P(W), and as a result
the E(ð) increases, as does the optimal bid and expected payoff to the bidder.  6 An alternative would be to use a Bayesian transformation similar to Wilson and Diersen which was used
recently to analyze international oilseed tenders.
4
Stochastic Simulation of Bidding Strategies  
Optimal bids were derived in this study using stochastic simulation
6 (Winston). 
Specifically, a prototypical bidder is posed to compete against rivals based on past bidding
behavior.  This is depicted in estimated bid functions, one for each competitor.  There are two
important sources of uncertainty.  One is the error associated with the expected bid of rivals.  The
other is whether they submit a bid.  In this case, N, the number of bidders, is a random variable
and has important impacts on bidding strategies and competition.  Stochastic simulation was used
to simulate bidding and incorporated these sources of uncertainty.  The probability of winning and
expected profits were derived from simulation results for a range of prospective bids.  Then,
optimal bids were defined using a search procedure across prospective bid values.  
Statistical Analysis of Bidding in International Wheat Contracts
Data Sources and Characteristics
The data used in this study were for a private importer of hard wheats from the United
States and Canada.  The importer purchased wheat individually (as opposed to as an association),
on a regular basis (typically quarterly), and the data reflects tenders covering the period from
August 1993 to May 1999.  Three wheat classes were imported separately during this period
[hard amber durum (HAD), hard red spring (HRS), and hard red winter (HRW)].  All bids were
flat priced and on a C&F (cost and freight) basis.  The buyer allowed for U.S. or Canadian wheats
to be offered at the sellers' option.  In some cases, exporters offered only Canadian wheat, in
others they offered only U.S. origin, and in others they offered both U.S. and Canadian, at
sometimes different values but in each case they were represented as buyer's option.  It is
important that sales of Canadian wheat to this buyer were not made directly by the CWB, but
instead were made through accredited exporters (AE), an important distinction in sales strategies. 
Summary statistics for tenders are presented for each of the wheat classes in Table 1. 
There were 21 tenders for HRS wheat, 23 for HAD, and 17 for HRW.  Each tender consisted of a
different number of suppliers as well as different numbers of offers made by each supplier. 
Multiple bids were provided by suppliers that offered wheat from both origins.  Ten firms
submitted bids for HRS, while 11 firms submitted bids for HAD, and 12 firms submitted bids for
HRW wheat.  Each class of wheat averaged five firms bidding per tender.  The maximum number
of firms submitting offers in any one tender was seven.  The average number of bids per tender
was nine for HRS, eight for HAD, and seven for HRW.
Alternative cost indicators were examined to represent the time series variability in price
levels throughout the period covered by the tender data.  Ultimately, these are taken to represent
the opportunity cost for suppliers, and the variability through time reflects its changes.  Several
cost indicators were considered including:  1) futures in the case of HRS (Minneapolis) and HRW
(Kansas City); 2) the cash price for Minneapolis HAD Choice Milling; 3) FOB Gulf  values (U.S.
Wheat Associates); and 4) C&F prices, where the C&F value was defined as: P
C&F = Ft + Bt + Ot,
where Ft is the futures price, Bt is the basis value, and Ot is the ocean freight rate to the importing
country (USDA-AMS).   5
Table 1.  Sample Characteristics for Wheat Tenders
HRS HAD HRW
Number of Tenders 21 23 17
Bidders
Total firms  10 11 12
Average firms per tender 5 5 5
Maximum firms per tender 7 7 7
Offers
Total 181 189 118
Averaged across tenders 9 8 7
Bid functions were estimated separately for each class with each of these potential cost
indicators to identify that best reflecting bidder behavior.  These were used to account for
differences in costs over time, and the estimated function captures the bidder's behavioral
relationship.  The cost indicators were selected among the alternatives based on R
2s.  That
selected for HRS was the C&F value; for HRW, the Kansas City futures was chosen; and for
HAD, the FOB Minneapolis price was chosen.  These indicator values are the basis for the results
presented in the following sections.  
Statistical and Graphical Analysis of Bidding Behavior
The number of bids and bidders varied across HRS tenders (Figure 1).  Most of the
tenders are characterized with more bids than bidders, reflecting that multiple bids were submitted
by some participants.  The number of bidders fluctuated slightly from three to seven across
tenders.  Figure 2 shows the time-series of bid distributions and mean for each tender.  This
indicates a general trend toward tighter bid distributions in more recent tenders. 
Bid distributions were plotted against the C&F value (cost indicator) for each tender date
(Figure 3).  Results indicate the offers in each tender relative to a simple regression line typifying
a pooled bid function.  Variability in bid distributions across tenders was measured by the
standard deviation and has varied widely across tenders (Figure 4).  In earlier tenders, the 
standard deviation across offers was greatest, ranging to over $20/mt, but in more recent tenders


































































Figure 2.  HRS Tenders: Value of Bids7


























Figure 4.  HRS Tenders: Variation of Bids



































Figure 3.  HRS Tenders: Bid Values Relative to C&F7 Similar figures to those for HRS (Figures 2 through 4) were developed for HAD and HRW and are in the
Appendix.
8
Tender data were also examined for individual suppliers (Table 2).  For the HRS tenders,
the number of bids submitted ranged from 11 to 35.  Supplier E was the most active bidder with
35 bids.  There appears to be two distinct groups of bidders based on their participation.  The
more active group consists of Suppliers D, E, G, and I, while the other group is made up of C, F,
and H. 
Supplier F had the highest average bid at $204.5/mt and a standard deviation of $26/mt. 
Supplier H had the lowest average bid of $167.36/mt and standard deviation of $13.66/mt, but
participated in only 11 of the tenders.  A more relevant comparison across suppliers can be drawn
by evaluating the difference (spread) between bid prices and the cost indicator.  For HRS,
Supplier F has the highest average bid over the cost indicator ($10.48/mt).  The variability of the
spread between bids and indicator values was also largest for Supplier F (standard deviation of
$22.89/mt), indicating more random behavior than other suppliers.  The bidder with the lowest
spread between bids and indicator values was Supplier I, with a mean value of $0.82 and standard
deviation of $9.84.  The remaining bidders had average spreads between bids and cost indicators
of $5.28/mt or less.  Variability of the spread for bidders other than Supplier F had standard
deviations less than $10.00/mt.  
The percent of time suppliers won tenders is also shown (Table 2).  Supplier E won 33%
of the time, with G and I slightly lower.  The other competitors won less than 15% of the time,
with Supplier H not winning at all.  Generally, these are reflective of the implied margin for each
of the bidders.  Note that Suppliers E, G, and I had the greatest frequency of winning and had the
lowest deviation from the cost indicator (B-C) averaged across their individual tenders. 
Participation in tenders was also examined for durum tenders (Figure 5, Table 2). 
Supplier E made the most offers at 36, while H made the least at 14.  Suppliers F and H are the
only competitors who submitted less than 25 offers.  The deviation of the bid from the cost
indicator suggests slightly higher values due in part to the greater cost differential relative to HRS,
as well as the greater risk in durum trading versus other grains (Table 2).  Supplier F had the
lowest deviation at $9.57/mt.  However, Supplier F’s standard deviation is the highest of the
group at $21/mt.  This is an indication of the degree of randomness in the bidding behavior of
Supplier F.  Other competitors had a deviation from the cost indicator within a few dollars of each
other, ranging from $12-16/mt.  Supplier E has the lowest combination of mean deviation and
standard deviation, indicating more predictable bidding behavior.
7   
Tenders for HRW had the fewest tenders of the three classes (Figure 6).   Suppliers E and
G are the most prevalent competitors, with C, E, G, and I submitting more than 15 bids, while
Suppliers D, F, and H all submitted less than 15 bids.  Suppliers F and I had the highest average
bids ($190/mt and $158/mt, respectively) and the highest variability in bids ($25/mt and $28/mt,
respectively).  Suppliers G and H have the lowest spreads between bids and the cost indicator
ranging from $29/mt to $33/mt (these are larger because the cost indicator in this case was the
KCBT futures value).  However, firms H, C, and D have the lowest variability for the spread
between bids and indicator costs ($8/mt-$11/mt).  Finally, in the HRW tenders, three of the firms
did not win any of the tenders in contrast to only one firm for either HRS or HAD.9























C 14 21 180.31 19.05 4.74 7.82 13
D 16 31 194.78 25.24 5.28 5.95 12
E 18 35 184.48 24.76 1.03 8.35 33
F 13 18 204.46 26.00 10.48 22.89 8
G 19 31 184.53 23.56 2.25 7.96 28
H 7 11 167.36 13.66 3.86 6.18 0
I 19 28 189.21 27.04 0.82 9.84 25
--------------HAD Tenders---------------
C 18 26 207.38 31.60 15.86 12.03 11
D 18 26 223.89 37.68 15.75 14.45 16
E 21 36 220.54 35.82 12.20 11.80 27
F 12 16 238.25 23.24 9.57 21.06 31
G 22 33 217.98 37.13 15.46 14.24 9
H 9 14 201.77 33.00 14.06 11.97 0
I 21 29 220.93 33.81 14.39 15.43 33
--------------HRW Tenders---------------
C 11 17 155.92 14.72 41.14 10.02 0
D 11 14 155.39 11.63 34.72 12.97 45
E 14 23 154.44 17.46 33.85 10.74 27
F 8  9 189.83 24.95 47.76 19.57 0
G 11 19 149.46 15.49 29.73 14.07 25
H 6 11 144.59 12.82 32.92 8.21 0
I 12 15 158.46 28.46 35.88 11.46 40
* Percent of times the bidder had the lowest bid.  The values do not sum to one because these were derived using






































































Figure 6.  HRW Tenders: Number of Bids and Bidders by Tender11
Bid Functions.  Bid functions were estimated for the pooled sample and for each firm
separately within each wheat class.  The general form of that function was Bt = á0 + â0@Ct + åt,
where Bt is bid in tender on date t, Ct is the corresponding cost indicator (as described above) for 
date t, á0 and â0 are estimated coefficients, and åt is the error term.  A simple linear form was used
for all three classes.
Results for HRS are shown in Table 3 and Figures 7 through 9 for Suppliers C-I and each
class.  Bid functions of the pooled sample and major suppliers are shown for comparison.  The
R
2s are relatively high for HRS tenders.  Most of the participants are characterized with high R
2s
(>.80), indicating they are highly predictable.  However, Supplier F has an extremely low R
2 (.27),
meaning F’s bidding behavior is less predictable in relation to other participants.  For HAD, the
R
2s differ slightly from the HRS case, some being higher and some lower.  The pooled sample is
slightly higher at .84 versus .81 in the HRS market.  For HRW, R
2 s were the lowest of the three
classes.  The pooled sample had an R
2 of .61.  Bid functions for individual suppliers also had R
2s
that were lower than for the other classes. 
The RMSE (or åt) is the measure of uncertainty about rivals’ bids in our analysis.  These
values vary greatly both within wheat class tenders as well as between wheat class tenders.  These
range from a low of 6.44 for Supplier D in HRS to a high of 23.62 for Supplier F.  Generally
there was a greater RMSE for durum than the other classes. 12
Table 3.  Bid Functions by Firm for HRS, HAD, and HRW Tenders
Bidder # of Bids
Bid Function
Intercept (á0)    Slope (â0) RMSE R
2 P(bid)
--------------HRS----------------
pooled 175 17.17 0.92 11.04 0.81 1
C 21 -4.77 1.05 8.24 0.83 .67
D 31 13.05 0.96 6.44 0.94 .76
E 35 21.73 0.88 8.10 0.90 .86
F 18 76.90 0.66 23.62 0.27 .62
G 31 18.07 0.91 8.01 0.89 .90
H 11 -27.34 1.19 6.48 0.82 .33
I 28 17.01 0.91 10.70 0.85 .90
--------------HAD----------------
pooled 180 35.37 0.90 14.03 0.85 1
C 18 39.29 0.88 11.76 0.87 .78
D 18 32.26 0.92 14.71 0.86 .78
E 21 24.64 0.94 11.94 0.90 .91
F 12 107.90 0.57 19.01 0.41 .52
G 22 30.73 0.92 14.40 0.86 .96
H 9 16.22 0.99 12.92 0.87 .39
I 21 40.77 0.87 15.31 0.81 .91
--------------HRW----------------
pooled 108 44.70 0.93 13.43 0.61 1
C 11 52.33 0.90 10.59 0.54 .65
D 11 106.94 0.40 11.24 0.20 .65
E 14 36.38 0.98 11.24 0.62 .82
F 8 84.60 0.74 21.19 0.44 .47
G 11 83.25 0.55 11.53 0.50 .65
H 6 37.29 0.96 9.07 0.59 .35
I 12 10.11 1.21 11.27 0.86 .7113







































































Figure 8.  HAD Tenders: Estimated Bid Functions14
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Figure 9.  HRW Tenders: Estimated Bid Functions
Regression results indicate a few differences among competitors.  In the case of HRS,
Suppliers C and H have a negative intercept with slope (â0) being greater than one.  Supplier F
has a relatively high intercept of 76.90 with a relatively low â0 of .66.  The other competitors vary
only slightly from the pooled intercept and coefficient.  Differences among these firms’ parameters
are likely a reflection of differences in fixed and marginal costs.  T tests were conducted to test
the individual estimates against the pooled estimates (Table 4).  Estimates for Bidders G and E are
not statistically different from the pooled sample.  However, this is likely due to the number of
bids these firms submitted.  Their associated bids make up a large part of the pooled sample.  For
purposes of later analysis, their individual estimates are used.
The effect of random bidders is an important component in determining optimum bids. 
Not every supplier participated in each tender (Table 2).  P(bid) is defined as the probability of
submitting a bid in a particular tender.  Most of the competitors in the analyses participated in
more than 60% of tenders, with firms G and I bidding in 90% of tenders.  Firm H only
participated 33% of the time. 
In the case of durum, Suppliers E and H have a slightly lower intercept and higher cost
coefficient than the rest of the group.  Supplier F has a large intercept of 107, low coefficient for
the cost indicator of .57, low R
2 of .41, and a high RMSE of 19.  The rest of the suppliers have
nearly identical bid functions.  Coefficients for most firms for HAD are close to the pooled results
of 35 for the intercept term and 0.9 for the cost coefficient.  Again, coefficients for the cost
indicator (slope) were less than one.  For HAD tenders, most firms participated more than 75% of
the time with three firms participating more than 90% of the time (firms E, G, and I). Two firms
(F and H) participated to a lesser extent (52% and 39%, respectively).15
Table 4.  HRS Tenders:  Significance of Individual Bid Functions Relative to Pooled
Estimates
Bidder Critical T Calculated T Result H0=0
C 1.96 8.45 Reject 
D 1.96 -6.13 Reject
E 1.96 0.25 Fail to Reject
F 1.96 -9.45 Reject
G 1.96 1.43 Fail to Reject
H 1.96 19.59 Reject
I 1.96 -4.08 Reject
*Tests performed at 95% confidence level.  Coefficients for E and G are not statistically
  different from the pooled estimate.
  In the HRW market, the bid functions differ the most among competitors compared to
the other markets.  Most of the suppliers’ bid functions had lower R
2 than did firms in the other
wheat classes.  Only two firms had bid functions with R
2 higher than .6 (Suppliers E and I). 
Coefficients for the cost indicators were .93 for the pooled sample and less than one for individual
suppliers except for Supplier I (1.21).  Of the suppliers, Suppliers D and F had the lowest cost
indicator coefficients (.40 and .55, respectively). 
Impacts of Canadian Offers on Bidding Behavior.  An important competitive aspect in
this market is that of U.S. and Canadian wheat being offered jointly by some suppliers during the
same tender.  To capture this potential effect on bidding behavior, a revised bid function was
estimated as: B = á0 + áR@R + â0@C + âR@C@R + å, where variables are as previously defined and R
is a binary variable representing bids for grain from Canadian origins, C*R represents an
interaction term between the cost indicator and wheat from Canadian origins, and áR and âR
represent estimated coefficients.  The binary and interaction terms were added to capture any
potential slope and intercept effects of offering wheat from Canadian origins. 
The statistical results are shown in Tables 5 and 6 for HRS.  Results indicate the effect of
Canada as an option for HRS is not statistically significant.  For HRS, in no case were coefficients
for intercept or slope effects of Canadian offers significant ( i.e., both áR and âR were
insignificant).  This is somewhat evident in the data shown in Figures 10 and 11 which
distinguishes offers of U.S. and Canadian origin wheats.  To confirm this, a series of F-tests were
performed to further test the significance of the Canada effect, áR and âR.  The critical and
calculated F values indicate the Canada variables are not statistically different from zero at the
95% level.  Thus, the estimated equation with only C&F as an independent variable is sufficient in
predicting bidding behavior of competitors.  The Canada effect is examined further in the
sensitivity section.16
Table 5.  Impact of Canadian Offers on HRS Bid Functions









pooled 175 21.92 1.06 -12.80 0.06 12.60 .76
C 21 29.17 1.02 -5.21 0.01 12.60 .64
D 31 -14.96 1.30 26.58 -0.18 8.13 .91
E 35 23.85 1.02 -18.08 0.13 9.95 .86
F 18 106.10 0.59 21.91 * 25.03 .23
G 31 13.57 1.12 17.87 -0.16 10.13 .84
H 11 24.20 1.00 -22.37 0.18 7.83 .79
I 28 26.04 1.03 -22.28 0.12 12.30 .82
* Model not at full rank.






C 4.41 0.45 0.21
D 4.20 0.56 0.92
E 4.16 2.42 0.37
G 4.20 2.82 1.22
H 5.32 1.32 1.42
I 4.24 0.02 0.63
*Fail to reject H0:  B0 is not significantly different from zero. 17








































Figure 10.  Relationship Between Bids for U.S. and Canadian Spring Wheat and Mpls.
Futures Prices
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Figure 11.  Relationship Between Bids for U.S. and Canadian Durum Wheat and Mpls.
Milling Prices18
For HAD, the effects of Canadian offers were significantly different from U.S. offers when
examined using the pooled sample.  Regression parameters indicated Canadian offers were more
competitive at lower indicator values and less competitive at higher indicator values (lower
intercept, higher slope) (Appendix Table 1).  Estimated coefficients  for Canadian effects on
individual firms were not statistically significant for HAD.  Results of F-tests were similar to those
for HRS and indicated that effects of Canadian offers for HAD were not statistically significant
(Appendix Table 2). 
These results indicate that a supplier’s bid function is not affected by whether Canadian
origin is offered as an alternative.  This suggests that the supplier’s bidding behavior is the same
for U.S. and Canadian wheats.  Strategically, this suggests that at least in this market which uses
very micro-data, there is no evidence that Canadian wheat is sold at a premium (as found in
aggregate by Kraft, Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz).  A fundamental reason for this is likely that this
market is served by Accredited Exporters (AE) as opposed to CWB direct sales.  Effectively, any
potential premium would be captured by the AE through the tendering process.
Analysis of Bidding Strategies
Optimal bids for a prototypical bidder (Z) are developed in this section.  These are derived
using a stochastic simulation model (Winston, p. 91-94) based on past behavior of rivals (bid
functions) and uncertainty about rivals’ bids (prediction error or RMSE).  Sensitivities are used to
demonstrate effects of key variables on optimal bids and expected payoffs.  Since effects of
Canadian offers were not statistically different from bid functions representing both U.S. and
Canadian origins, only bid functions representing firms’ bids as a function of the cost indicator
were utilized.  However, as described below, the potential effect of offers of Canadian origin is
interpreted as an increase in the number of offers, with an increase in random participation.  The
effects of other variables are examined including the effect of number of competitors,  relative
cost structures, informational uncertainty, and correlation of offers.
A base case bidding strategy for a prototypical supplier (Z) was derived and sensitivities
conducted following Winston.  The bid functions are used to generate bids by each competitor. 
The indicator value is a fixed value across competitors in estimating bids.  Error terms for each
rival are assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero and ó = RMSE.  The uncertainty
associated with the error term allows the bids of competitors to fluctuate over a representative
range.  
The effect of random bidders has an important impact on bidding strategies and auction
results.  In simple formulations (e.g., Monroe) these are captured by using a transformation
including the portion of auctions in which the bidder participates.  In the stochastic simulation, a
binomial distribution was used to account for the randomness of each bidder participating. 
Specifically, each bidder was viewed as either bidding (1) or not bidding (0) with a distribution
where the probability of bidding is from Table 2.  For example, a binomial distribution with
parameters (1, 0.75) indicates a bidder submits a bid 75% of the time.  If the bidder submits a bid,
their bid is represented by the function Bt = á0 + â0Ct + åt.  
The probability of winning and expected payoff are derived for alternative bids submitted
by Bidder Z.  These values are derived over a range of alternative bids to determine that which
maximizes expected payoffs, which is the optimal bid.  Sensitivities are conducted to examine
influences on the optimal bid.  In the base case, CZ=C=$205/mt for deriving bids for Bidder Z19
(i.e., Z’s cost is $205 and equal to the cost indicator applied to all rivals) for HRS and HAD and
CZ=C=$160/mt for HRW.  
The Optimal Bid.  The cost indicators, optimal bids, and the probability of winning for
each class are shown in Table 7.  These results indicate that in the case of HRS tenders, the cost
for the Bidder Z and all rivals is Ck=C=$205/mt, and the optimal bid is  $207.5/mt.  The
probability of winning at this level is .03 resulting in an expected payoff of $0.08/mt.  That for
durum is $211.5/mt with a probability of winning of .19 and expected payoff of $1.23/mt.  For
HRW, the optimal bid was $173.00/mt with a probability of winning of .38 and expected payoff
of $4.91/mt.  The reason for the apparent large difference in the expected payoff across classes is
that different cost indicators were used.














HRS 205 207.50 .032 0.08
HAD 205 211.50 .189 1.23
HRW 160 173.00 .377 4.91
There are several important variables that affect these results.  These include the number of
bidders (n), the standard error of the bid functions (reflecting information), and the randomness of
bidding.  
Number of Bidders.  The impact of additional competitors reduces the probability of
having the winning bid.  Given the definition of P(W) (see p. 5); a reduction in the number of
rivals would increase the probability of winning.  Expected payoffs for different levels of
competition are shown in Figure 12 and Table 8.  To illustrate this effect, the probability of
successfully underbidding all competitors was calculated.  Each competitor is added successively
based on their probability of participation.  
The optimal bid, when competing against G was $211, with a probability of winning of .23
and expected payoff of $1.37/mt.  Adding Competitor I reduces the optimal bid to $209/mt,
probability of winning to .10, and expected payoff to $0.42/mt.  For each additional competitor,
the optimal bid, probability of winning, and expected payoff are decreased.  If all competitors
participate, the optimal bid is $206.5/mt, with probability of winning of 0.014, and expected
payoff of $0.02/mt. 
These results illustrate that the number of bidders has a critical effect on the optimal bid
and expected payoff.  In the case of import tenders represented by this data where an average of
five firms submitted bids in each tender, there should be sufficient competition to assure intense
rivalry.20
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Figure 12.  HRS Tenders: Effect of Number of Competitors on Expected Payoff










1: G 211 .229% 1.37
2: G, I 209 .104% 0.42
3: G, I, E 208 .036% 0.11
4: G, I, E, D 207 .036% 0.07
5: G, I, E, D, C 207 .025% 0.05
6: G, I, E, D, C, F 207 .015% 0.03
7: All Competitors 206.5 .014% 0.02
Cz=Cost=$205/mt21
Random Bidders.  Rivals do not participate in each tender.  To examine the effect of
random bidders, the base case results are compared to a case with 100% participation by all
bidders (Table 7).  The optimal bid in the base case is $207.5/mt, with a probability of winning of
0.032, and expected payoff of $0.08/mt.  If all competitors bid in 100% of the tenders, these
results are decreased to an optimal bid of $206.5, probability of winning of .014, and expected
payoff of $0.02/mt.  Thus, a reduction (increase) in randomness of bidding has the effect of
reducing (increasing) the optimal bid and expected payoff.
Effects of Relative Cost Structure on Strategies.  A key variable in formulating bidding
strategies is the competitor’s cost relative to the rest of the participants.  In the base case, these
are fixed at the same C&F value (C=Cz=$205/mt) and was derived as $190 FOB plus $15 for
ocean shipping.  Since FOB values do not vary substantially across competitors, the ocean freight
rate was adjusted to illustrate the effect of cost differentials among competitors; or more likely,
source of interfirm variability.  The base rate of $15 was adjusted for Competitor Z by factors of
.8, .9, 1.1, and 1.2 to measure the effect on optimal bids.  
Results are shown in Table 9.  At 80% (CZ=$202/mt), the optimal bid is $205/mt, the
probability of winning is .077, and an expected payoff of  $0.23/mt.  The optimal bid at 90%
(CZ=$203.5/mt) is $206.5/mt, with a probability of winning of .048, and expected payoff of
$.14/mt.  If Competitor Z is at a cost disadvantage of 110% (CZ=$206.5/mt), the optimal bid
increases to $209.5, and the probability of winning decreases to .015 with an expected payoff of
$0.04/mt. 










80% (202.0) 205.0 .077 0.23
90% (203.5) 206.5 .048 0.14
Base (205.0) 207.5 .032 0.08
110% (206.5) 209.5 .015 0.04
120% (208.0) 210.0 .012 0.02
*Base C&F = 205
*FOB = 190
*Basis & Freight =15 (Adjusted for sensitivity)
These results indicate a significant advantage to a competitor with lower costs relative to
the other participants.  This competitor has a higher probability of underbidding competitors
resulting in higher expected payoffs.  However, if a competitor has higher costs relative to other
participants, the best action may be to stay out of the auction. 
Effects of Bidder Information on Strategies.  Another key variable in determining
optimal bidding strategies is information about rivals.  In practice, various means are used to
discern likely rival bids.  Of particular importance is the revelation of bids in previous tenders.  If22
past bidding behavior is observable, a competitor has information that can be used to predict a
rival’s future behavior.  The buyer/auctioneer may or may not choose to reveal such information
after each tender. 
The RMSE is a measure of informational uncertainty about bidding behavior of rivals.  In
the base case, the RMSE was that from the original bid functions.  This is adjusted using a scalar 
from .5 to 2 to represent lesser/greater informational uncertainty and to measure the effect of
information about rivals in formulating bidding strategies.  Optimal bids are derived assuming the
base case binomial distributions for participation by competitors.  Results are shown in 
Table 10.  At .5@RMSE, the optimal bid is $206.50/mt.  As the informational uncertainty (RMSE)
increases, the optimal bid increases.  At 2@RMSE, the optimal bid is $209/mt.  
These results have important implications for bidders and importers.  An increase in
RMSE for all competitors has the effect of increasing the optimal bid and expected payoff.  For
buyers/auctioneers, higher optimal bids and payoffs are undesirable.  It is in the buyer’s interest to
adopt mechanisms to the extent possible to reduce the RMSE, or enhance the predictability of
bidding behavior among bidders to intensify competition.  This can be achieved by releasing
information on bid results to participants--note, this would not eliminate bidder uncertainty, but
would reduce it substantially.  
The RMSEs varied slightly across the three classes of wheat.  The range for HRS was 6-
10, with Supplier F at 23.  The range was 9 to 11 for HRW, with F at 21.  The largest RMSEs
were for the HAD market, with a range of 12 to 19.  This greater informational uncertainty would
have the effect of raising bids and payoffs for durum relative to HRS.









0.50 206.5 .036 0.054
0.75 207.0 .033 0.067
1.00 207.5 .032 0.080
1.25 208.0 .029 0.086
1.50 208.5 .026 0.091
1.75 208.5 .030 0.106
2.00 209.0 .025 0.099
Cx=Cost=$205/mt
Impacts of Canada Option on Bidder Strategies.  The statistical analysis of bid functions
for each bidder (firm) offering U.S. and Canadian wheat indicated that slope and interaction terms
to account for Canadian offers were not statistically different.  However, the probability of
Canadian wheat being offered varies over time and across firms.  To account for this effect,
simulations were conducted where bidders, representing Canadian offers and the proportion of8 Typically auctions are categorized as “private” or “common” value (Rasmusen, P. 294).  For “common”
value auctions, the cost/value of the item is the same for all bidders and each bidder makes independent estimates
of this uncertain value.  For private value auctions, each bidder has their own independent valuation for an object
which is unaffected by opponents’ valuations.
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time they bid, were incorporated.  Canadian offers were treated as random with the probability of
being offered represented by a binomial distribution.  Hence, the Canada effect is interpreted as 1)
an increase in number of bids (i.e., by the number of incumbents now offering U.S. and Canada);
and 2) a component of randomness for offers being submitted.  This means that the effect of
Canadian origins is for an increase in randomness in bidding by firms offering Canadian origin.  
Given N is already relatively large, the Canada effect should be viewed as highly minimal. 
The same bid functions are used by each competitor.  The probability of each firm submitting an
offer for Canadian wheat is calculated and incorporated into a binomial distribution.  Probabilities
were derived from the data to account for participating firms submitting U.S. origin, Canadian
origin, or both.   
Results are similar to the base case.  The optimal bid is now $207/mt versus $207.50 in
the base case, and the probability of winning is reduced from .032 to .017.  The expected payoff is
reduced from $0.08/mt to $0.03/mt.  Thus, the effect of Canadian offers is to reduce the optimal
bid by about $0.50/mt. 
Effect of Correlated Bidders on Optimal Bid.  In most cases values for bidders are
different, but may be correlated (Rasmusen, p. 294).
8  To account for this effect, the model was
modified to include the impact of correlations among bids and to determine their effects on
optimal bids and probability of winning.  This was simulated by imposing a correlation in the
random draws of the errors in the estimated bid functions within the simulation.  Correlations
were estimated from the tender data for HRS by firm and are shown in Table 11.  The model was
simulated and results were then compared to the base case values for HRS.  
Table 11.  Estimated Correlations Between Firm Bids, HRS
Firm C Firm D Firm E Firm F Firm G Firm H Firm I
Firm C 1.00 0.87 0.88 0.64 0.94 0.95 0.81
Firm D 1.00 0.86 0.64 0.78 0.74 0.69
Firm E 1.00 0.47 0.95 0.94 0.81
Firm F 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.79
Firm G 1.00 0.99 0.90
Firm H 1.00 0.98
Firm I 1.00
Estimated correlation coefficients between bidder's bids indicate a high degree of
correlation exists among bidders.  Many of the estimated correlation coefficients were greater
than .8.  Simulation results indicate that when the correlations among rival's bids are accounted
for, the results change quite substantially.  Specifically, the probability of winning increases
(Figure 13) and the optimal bids increase from $207.5/mt in the base case to $210/mt when firms’
correlated bids are included in the simulation.  The expected profit for optimal bids also increased
from less than $0.10/mt in the base case to more than $0.60/mt when bids are correlated.  This is9 This is one of the motivations of the concerns about selling state-owned assets.  As a result of the
winner’s curse, buyers pay more for the asset than they can recoup which may shift further investment in the
industry (The Economist).
10  Wilson (1987) applies this in a Nash Equilibrium setting, which is not necessarily the case in the
current tender data for wheat.  A key variable that is missing is the true cost for the winning competitor, which
ultimately determines the degree of the winner’s curse.  
11 A similar analysis was done for HAD and is presented in Appendix Table 3. 
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caused by the greater correlation among firms’ bids, which if incorporated, reduces the probability
of an individual firm extending a bid widely divergent from opposing bidders’ offers, thereby
increasing the probability of winning. 
Prospective Effects of Winner’s Curse in Grain Tenders.  The winner’s curse has been
used to describe outcomes of bidding situations whereby the result of winning the auction leads to
extremely low or even negative profits.  In the context of this auction, each rival submits a bid
based on their expected cost of delivering the grain and expectations of rivals’ bids.  If the bidder
wins the tender, he may have done so by having the lowest cost estimate relative to other
competitors.  This ultimately would be due to his cost estimate being biased relative to the true
cost, and the winner is said to be “cursed” with negative profits (Wilson 1992; Thaler; Crampton). 
The problem of the winner’s curse has been persistent in auction literature beginning with analysis
of Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil leases (Capen, Clapp, and Campbell), and recently in
auctioning of airwaves (Crampton), in virtual auctions and the sale of state-owned assets, and was
highlighted as a major issue in risk analysis (Bernstein p. 244).
9  As noted by Coy in a recent
Business Week article, the winner’s curse is considered a part of doing business in many virtual
auctions with one participant indicating it was analogous to “Collecting money from newbies who
overbid because they’re ill-informed,” (Coy).  
In a buyer’s auction, bidders make offers based on cost expectations of rival behavior. 
The winner ends up offering it for less than expected costs.  In other words, the winner’s estimate
of cost is biased downward.  Winning means the bidder underestimated the cost.  Though the
estimate was originally unbiased, the winner’s bid is biased once the winner finds out they won. 
Thus, the true value is likely more than originally estimated.  Recognizing this problem should
induce bidders to adjust their bids to account for the winner’s curse.  In import tenders, this
should result in shading the bid upwards.  The relevant estimate is the value “conditional on
winning” (i.e., that your estimate was lowest among the rivals).
Wilson (1987), Crampton, and Winston outline procedures to measure the effect of the
winner’s curse in the case of buyers’ auctions.  Each rival has their estimate of the value of a
tender with an unbiased error term.  By winning the auction, a bidder may infer a bias in the error
term.  Wilson derives this normal bias factor, which is then divided by the standard deviation to
obtain the standardized bias which indicates how much the estimated value is over (under) stated
in a seller’s (buyers’) auction.  This bias is then applied to the equilibrium bidding strategy to
determine how much the bid should be shaded to account for this bias.  The effect is impacted by
the number of rivals and the amount of uncertainty.
We applied similar procedures to our wheat tender data to estimate the prospective
impacts of the winner’s curse.
10  Results are shown in Table 12 for HRS.
11  To illustrate theinterpretation of these results, we refer to Competitor E that has the highest normal bias (sum of
deviations between winning bid and competitors’ bids is an average of $14.16/mt).  This amounts
Thus, if E were to increase their bids by 7.7%, their estimate would be unbiased.  In order to
correct for the winner’s curse, bidders should adjust their bids by this amount.  The bias
However, this estimate of bias may overstate effects due to consideration of non-serious bidders
as developed below.
winning bid and the next lowest alternative following Dyer and Kagel.  This reduces the effect of
non-serious bidders and also has a more direct economic interpretation (money left on the table). 
Appendix Table 3 for HAD.  Compared to results for the initial bias estimation, these should
provide a prospective range for the effects of the winner’s curse.  Average differences between
the table varies widely across bidders.  Average differences range from $0.40/mt for Bidder F to a
high of $5.96/mt for Bidder D.  This amounts to 0.2% to 3.1% of the value of the tender left on
however, the extent of change varies across bidders.  For example, bias for Bidder E declines
from 7.7% of value for the initial bias estimation to 1.8% when compared to the next lowest
alternative, respectively).  These results suggest that the effect of the winner’s curse in these
wheat tenders could be as little as 0.2% of bid value to as large as 7.7%.  Using this approach,
the winner’s curse.  Results for the normal bias estimations and comparisons to the next lowest
competitor for HAD were similar to those for HRS, although bias as a percent of average bids26
Table 12.  HRS Tenders:  Winner’s Curse
Bidder
Bidder

















Units Percent $/mt Percent
C 180.31   8.24   6.58 0.80 3.7% 5.44 3.0%
D 194.78   6.44 10.24 1.59 5.3% 5.96 3.1%
E 184.48   8.10 14.16 1.75 7.7% 3.32 1.8%
F 204.46 23.62   9.38 0.40 4.6% 0.40 0.2%
G 184.53   8.01   3.57 0.45 1.9% 1.34 0.7%
I  189.21   6.48 11.16 1.72 5.9% 5.23 2.8%
*H never won a tender, so no bias could be calculated.
Summary/Implications
Auctions are used frequently in agricultural marketing, typically as a mechanism in
procurement strategy.  As such, auctions play two important roles, price discovery (or
determination) and supplier selection (allocation).  One of the more common forms of auctions in
agriculture is by importers tendering for the purchase of grains.  This study developed an
analytical model of bidding and used actual firm and auction tender data to draw inferences about
the effect of crucial variables on the tendering strategies and results.  Though applied to the case
of wheat importing, the results are generally applicable and provide some important insight into
the form of competition and implications for buyers and sellers of these mechanisms (which, as it
turns out, have escalated in importance in recent years, in part due to the Internet).  
Wheat tender data were analyzed and bid functions generated by class of wheat (HRS,
HAD, and HRW) and by firm.  There were a number of characteristics of the bids and strategies
that were interesting.  First, there was a surprisingly wide range of bids.  Variation of bids across
firms submitted for individual HRS tenders had standard deviations that ranged from $5/mt or less
in a number of tenders, to as high as $22/mt.  Tenders for HAD show similar variability.   Second,
the spreads between bids and observed costs varied substantially among rivals.  Third, it was
common that some bidders only bid periodically.  Fourth, the estimated bid functions were mostly
significantly different among bidders.  These results confirm that rivals have differing expectations
of each other’s bids, and also suggests that their fixed and marginal costs differ.   Finally, the
option of allowing the supplier to provide Canadian or U.S. wheat did not have a statistically
significant effect on the bid functions.
A stochastic simulation model was used to analyze bidding strategies and optimal bids. 
Simulations were then conducted on some of the interesting variables to draw implications. 
Several results are of interest.  First, optimal bids varied across the wheat classes and through27
time, as expected.  Expected payoffs were from as low as $.08/mt for HRS, to 1.23$/mt for
durum, and even higher for HRW.  These optimal bids were affected by a number of variables
including the number of bidders (optimal bids fell with a larger number of bidders), the
randomness of bidder participation (less frequent and more random bidding had the effect of
increasing the optimal bid), relative supplier costs (firms with lower costs would have lower
optimal bids), and information bidders have about their rivals’ behavior.  In the latter case,
optimal bids decrease as bidders’ information about each other increases.  
The results are obvious, though the magnitude of the effects are interesting.  There were
three impacts that we analyzed that provide a little more insight into international wheat auctions. 
One was the impact of Canadian wheat being solicited as an option to U.S. wheat.  Given the bid
functions were not significantly impacted by this option, it was inferred that the effect was to
provide an increase in the number of offers and by the randomness of Canadian wheat being
offered.  Taking these into account indicated that the impact of this Canadian option was to
reduce the optimal bid by about 50c/mt relative to the base case.  The second interesting effect 
was that of correlated bids among rivals which had the effect of raising the optimal bid.  Finally, 
there is the effect of the winner's curse--a common problem in bidding competition whereby
winning, a bidder likely has underestimated their cost and the probability of a negative payoff
increases.  Accounting for this effect illustrated the extent that bidders’ costs are biased and by
how much they should shade their bids in anticipation of the winner's curse. 
These results have a number of implications for researchers trying to understand inter-firm
and inter-country rivalry in this industry for buyers and for sellers.  A few are identified.  The
results illustrate the effect that tendering has on inter-firm as well as inter-country competition. 
Specifically, even with as few as four to five suppliers, tendering has the effect of instilling  intense
competition among suppliers.  From a buyer perspective, tendering is attractive, and in fact
critical, given that buyers cannot observe costs and that suppliers’ costs vary among each other
and through time.  The value of using a tender escalates as the number of bidders increases (even
though it appears that a very large number is not critical), as information about bidders is more
transparent, and as bidders’ offers are less correlated.  From a seller perspective, auctions can
result in brutal competition among participants.  To be successful in markets that take this form, it
is essential that firms are low cost, that they have extensive information about their rivals’
behavior and costs, and that they adjust their bids to reduce the effects of the winner’s curse. 
Finally, in this case, there is no evidence that the single seller, selling through accredited
exporters, is capable of significantly influencing the results.28
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Appendix Figure 1.  HAD Bid Values35

































Appendix Figure 4.  Relationship Between HRW Bids and KC HRW Futures Prices

































Appendix Figure 3.  Relationship Between HAD Bids and Mpls Milling Durum Prices36


























Appendix Figure 6.  Standard Deviation of HRW Bids, by Tender


























Appendix Figure 5.  HAD Standard Deviation of Bids Within Tenders37
Appendix Table 1.  Impact of Canadian Offers on HAD Bid Functions









pooled 180 44.47 0.85 -25.36** 0.13** 13.9 .85
C 26 48.23 0.83 -41.90 0.24 11.8 .88
D 26 39.47 0.89 -22.18 0.10 15.2 .86
E 36 31.86 0.91 -16.62 0.07 12.2 .89
F 16 111.32 0.56 -8.02 * 19.6 .42
G 33 50.31 0.84 -50.57 0.24 14.1 .87
H 14 0.57 1.05 18.87 -0.07 13.9 .87
I 29 28.82 0.91 12.41 -0.03 15.5 .82
* Model not at full rank.
** Statistically significant p=.05.






C 4.28 1.96 0.14
D 4.28 0.38 0.02
E 4.14 0.38 0.19
G 4.17 2.88 0.41
H 4.84 0.10 0.35
I 4.23 0.01 1.39
*Fail to reject H0: B0 is not significantly different from zero.38
Appendix Table 3.  HAD Tenders:  Winner’s Curse
Bidder
Bidder

















Units Percent $/mt Percent
C 207.4 11.76   4.34 0.37 2.1%   0.00 0.0
D 223.9 14.71   9.72 0.66 4.3%   2.02 0.9
E 220.5 11.94  6.52 0.55 3.0%   2.41 1.1
F 238.3 19.01 17.49 0.92 7.3% 10.83 4.5
G 218.0 14.40 20.50 1.42 9.4% 11.00 5.1
I 220.9 15.31 15.12 0.99 6.8%   7.44 3.4
*H never won a tender, so no bias could be calculated.